CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF THE
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ACT
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ......................................

515

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEATH PENALTY
STATUTES

A. McGautha v. California ......................... 516
B. Furm an v. Georgia ............................. 521
C. Gregg v. Georgia .............................. 522
D. ConstitutionalRequirements at the Penalty
Proceeding .................................... 526
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT ACT

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
IV .

Overview .....................................
Bifurcated Trials ...............................
New Jersey's Selection of Aggravating Circumstances
New Jersey's Selection of Mitigating Circumstances .
EstablishingAggravating and Mitigating
Circumstancesat the Penalty Trial ...............
The Denial of Mercy ............................

CONCLUSION

.......................................

I.

529
530
533
536
538
547
548

INTRODUCTION

After a ten year moratorium, the New Jersey Legislature has
reenacted a death penalty statute. The most salient feature of the
statute' is, of course, the reinstatement of the state's power to impose
the death penalty. 2 While the statute retains the definitional proviN.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-3, :43-7 (West 1982).
2 In 1971, the United States Supreme Court vacated death sentences imposed under New
Jersey law. See Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) (mem.). The Court offered no
explanation as to why the death sentences were reversed. Rather, it simply cited Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969), Maxwell v. Bishop, 398
U.S. 262 (1970), and United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), as supporting reversal.
Funicello, 403 U.S. at 948. Since only Jackson was applicable to the New Jersey statute, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942
(1972), concluded that the statute ran afoul of Jackson which held unconstitutional statutes
"needlessly encouraging" guilty pleas. Id. at 65-69. This marked a shift in position for the New
Jersey Supreme Court, which, four years earlier had concluded that the New Jersey statute was
unaffected by Jackson since it did not needlessly encourage guilty pleas entered to avoid the
death sentence. See State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968), rev'd sub nom. Funicello
v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) (mem.).
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sions of the former murder statute, 3 a penalty phase proceeding has
been incorporated into the murder trial. 4 The addition of this penalty
phase proceeding illustrates that the death penalty statute has added
both substantively 5 and procedurally 6 novel elements to the mechanism for punishing murderers. These elements have been taken from
other state death penalty statutes drafted to prevent the arbitrary and
capricious imposition of the death sentence. 7 The focus of the death
penalty statute is to define the circumstances which compel the imposition of the death sentence and to outline the procedures to be followed in making this determination.
Although constitutionally required to eliminate the arbitrary and
capricious imposition of the death sentence, the statute fails in this
regard. By eliminating protective devices available to the defendant at
trial, omitting a clear definition of the defendant's burden at the
penalty phase, and in certain instances, failing fully to define the
substantive factors which a jury must consider before imposing the
death sentence, the statute actually increases the probability of an
arbitrary and capricious sentence. Moreover, the jury's power to dispense mercy-a constitutional safeguard-has been eliminated from
the statute. The Act, therefore, represents such a substantial impairment of a capital defendant's constitutional rights that it must be held
to be unconstitutional.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEATH PENALTY STATUTES

A. McGautha v. California"
In McGautha, the United States Supreme Court upheld two
death sentences imposed under statutes granting juries virtually untrammeled discretion to decide who dies. 9 The petitioners argued that

: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a)(1)-(3) (West 1982).
Id. § 2C:11-3(c)(1).
5 See infra notes 110-40 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 95-109, 141-90, 212-18 and accompanying text.
7 Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1983) (separate sentencing
proceeding) and id. § 921.141(6) (mitigating circumstances) and GA. CODE ANN. § 27.2534.1
(Harrison 1983) (aggravating circumstances) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(1), (4), (5)
(West 1982) (New Jersey death penalty statute providing for bifurcated trials and consideration
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances).
8 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
' The California death penalty statute provided in part:
Evidence may be presented at the further proceeding on the issue of penalty, or the
circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and history of
any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. The determination of the
penalty of life imprisonment or death shall be in the discretion of the court or iury
4
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these statutes violated both the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.10 Conceding that the original
purpose of jury discretion, to dispense mercy in extraordinary cases,
had been constitutionally sound," the petitioners argued that juries
were not using discretion in a manner consistent with the purpose for
its creation. Instead, juries were using discretion to withhold the
death sentence in most instances, 2 while imposing the penalty on a
random few. The petitioners contended that they were among the
random few whom the jury had selected for death.' 3 Since there was
no basis for distinguishing the few from the many, they maintained
that no justification for the selection process existed. Without such
justification, they continued, the statute granted the jury untrammeled discretion with no rational basis for distinguishing murderers,
and accordingly violated the equal protection clause. "4 Further, the
petitioners maintained that the standardless selection process violated
substantive due process. 15
trying the issue of fact on the evidence presented, and the penalty fixed shall be
expressly stated in the decision or verdict.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1970) (repealed 1973).
The Ohio statute provided in part:
No person shall purposely, and either of deliberate and premeditated malice, or
by means of poison, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate rape, arson,
robbery, or burglary, kill another.
Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be
punished by death unless the jury trying the accused recommends mercy, in which
case the punishment shall be imprisonment for life.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Baldwin 1964) (repealed 1974).
10 402 U.S. at 196. Two cases were consolidated for trial in McGautha. The defendant in
McGautha challenged the California death penalty statute and the defendant in Crampton v.
Ohio, 398 U.S. 936 (1970), challenged the Ohio death penalty statute. 402 U.S. at 191, 195.
11 402 U.S. at 203.
12 Id. at 203-04. The petitioners agreed that the general imposition of the most severe penalty
and the infrequent imposition of life imprisonment comported with the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Id. They maintained that equal protection was
satisfied because almost every defendant convicted of murder would receive the death sentence.
Thus, those similarly situated were treated identically. Those instances in which convicted
murderers were spared this severe form of punishment would be easily distinguishable as rare
cases warranting different treatment. Id. Further, they maintained that due process was satisfied
because a general application of the death sentence would put all persons on notice that a
violation of the statute proscribing murder would lead to imposition of the death sentence. Id.
13 Id. at 204. The petitioners argued that the death penalty was being imposed on "far fewer
than half the defendants found guilty of capital crimes." Id. at 203. In fact, the petitioners'
estimate of persons receiving the death sentence who had been convicted of capital crimes was
high. In 1967, although approximately 400 persons were under sentence of death in the country,
between 1965 and 1969 only 10 people were actually executed. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1980, National Prisoner Statistics 1, 15 (Dec. 1981).
1' 402 U.S. at 204.
15 Id. The petitioners argued that "the legislatures have not only failed to provide a rational
basis for distinguishing" those who received the death penalty from those who did not receive the
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In rejecting the petitioners' claims and upholding the death sentences, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, viewed the petitioners' arguments primarily from a due process perspective. 6 The Court
focused on the history of capital punishment and the numerous unsuccessful attempts which had been made to identify the standards to be
used in sentencing decisions.' 7 The Court stated that it was "beyond
present human ability"' to define specifically and explain adequately
to the jury the characteristics which would give rise to the imposition
of the death penalty. 9 The Court stated that the Model Penal Code
illustrated the impossibility of developing uniform sentencing standards, 20 and it maintained that the development of appropriate standards was impossible because of the complexity and uncertainty of the
relevant factors. 2' The Court noted that the Code's drafters recog-

death penalty but that "they have failed even to suggest any basis at all." Id.; cf. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942) (when sentencing, although abstract symmetry is not
required there must be rational basis for distinguishing convicted felons to be sterilized).
16 402 U.S. at 196. The petitioners cited the fundamental lawlessness of the failure to provide
standards delimiting jury discretion on the punishment issue as violative of the due process
clause. Id. The Court characterized the petitioners' due process argument as having an undeniable surface appeal, but was not wholly persuaded.
11 The McGautha Court did not explain how the equal protection clause was satisfied by the
statutory provisions for standardless jury discretion. The Court's upholding the petitioners' death
sentences without analysis of the perceived constitutional infirmity is difficult to justify.
IS Id. at 204.
"' Id. at 197. The Court stated that the history of attempts to define those circumstances
which compelled the imposition of the death penalty dated to Biblical times and quoted for
support "the laws of Alfred, echoing Exodus 21:12-13 [which] provided: 'Let the man who
slayeth another willfully perish by death. Let him who slayeth another of necessity or unwillingly, or unwillfully as God may have set him into his hands, and for whom he has not lain in
wait be worthy of his life and of lawful bot if he seek an asylum.' " Id.
The Court, in analyzing historical attempts to define standards for the imposition of the
death sentence, confused the issue. The Biblical quotation and the laws of Alfred are an attempt
to distinguish degrees of murder and subsequent punishment, not degrees of punishment for the
same crime. Although different categorizations for an unlawful killing do result in different
penalties upon conviction, the distinction the petitioners were asking the Court to recognize was
a method for distinguishing the punishment of persons convicted of the same crime. The
petitioners in McGautha were not asserting that they did not commit first degree murder or that
they had killed in self-defense. Rather, they argued that there must be standards to distinguish
those convicted of first degree murder who would receive the death sentence from those convicted for first degree murder who would not.
20 402 U.S. at 205.
21 Id. at 203. In rejecting the standards set forth in the Model Penal Code, the Court stated:
It is apparent that such criteria do not purport to provide more than the most
minimal control over the sentencing authority's exercise of discretion. They do not
purport to give an exhaustive list of the relevant considerations or the way in which
they may be affected by the presence or absence of other circumstances. They do not
even undertake to exclude constitutionally impermissible considerations. And they
provide no protection against the jury determined to decide on whimsy or caprice. In
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nized that such factors were too complex to be compressed within a
simple formula. 22 Despite this inherent difficulty, the drafters considered it within the realm of possibility to list pertinent circumstances of
aggravation and mitigation which should be balanced by the sentencing authority. 23 The Court, however, soundly rejected these2 4standards
as providing no more than limited relevant considerations.
The McGautha Court also considered the propriety of employing
unitary trial proceedings in capital cases. 25 The petitioner argued that
a unitary trial proceeding forced him to forfeit either his fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination 26 or his due process
right to address the jury on the issue of punishment. 27 In this regard
the petitioner contended that no legitimate state interest was served
by imposing a Hobson's choice on defendants. 2 8 Accordingly, the
petitioner maintained that a bifurcated trial proceeding was constitutionally required to avoid this problem. 29 The Court rejected the

short, they do no more than suggest some subjects for the jury to consider during its
deliberations, and they bear witness to the intractable nature of the problem of
"'standards" which the history of capital punishment has from the beginning reflected. Thus, they indeed caution against this Court's undertaking to establish such
standards itself, or to pronounce at large that standards in this realm are constitutionally required.
Id. at 207.
Z5 Id. at 205.
3 Id. at 206.
24 Id. at 207.
The McGautha Court analyzed unitary trial proceedings in the context of the Ohio
statute, which provided for such trials. See generally supra note 9.
21 402 U.S. at 210-11. Crampton relied upon the explication of his fifth amendment privilege
as defined by the Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 402 U.S. at 210-11. In Malloy,
the Court defined the fifth amendment privilege as one free from any compulsion even "so mild a
whip" as the refusal to permit a suspect to call his wife unless he confessed to a crime. 378 U.S. at
7. By asserting one's fifth amendment protection, a defendant could shield himself from the
prosecution's cross-examination and thereby protect himself from impeachment by prior crimes
evidence. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; FED. R. EVID. 609.
21 402 U.S. at 211. Crampton argued that his sentence should not have been fixed without
the benefit of all relevant evidence. He relied upon Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), in
asserting that his testimony was relevant to the jury's decision on the punishment to be imposed.
402 U.S. at 211. In Townsend, the Court defined the defendant's due process rights at sentencing
as requiring a sentence imposed on the basis of accurate information. 334 U.S. at 741.
28 402 U.S. at 211. The petitioner sought to have the Court analyze the legislative effect of
requiring the election of constitutional protections in terms of a legitimate state interest test. This
test is generally used to determine whether a possible impairment of constitutional rights can be
justified because the legislation serves a legitimate state purpose which cannot be achieved in a
less intrusive manner. It is unlikely that Ohio could have satisfied the legitimate state interest test
since bifurcation would have eliminated the chilling of the petitioner's constitutional rights, thus
providing a less intrusive means to promote the state's goal.
21 Id. at 210-11. Crampton argued that the Court's holding in Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968), compelled bifurcated procedures. 402 U.S. at 211. In Simmons, the Court
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petitioner's arguments and held that: "Although a defendant may
have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever
course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always
forbid requiring him to choose." 30 The Court stated that the constitutionality of decisions requiring this choice depends upon whether the
31
policies behind the rights are impaired "to an appreciable extent.
The Court observed that the fifth amendment provides a vehicle to
attack " 'the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt,' "32 while the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
was intended to promote fundamental fairness and decency. The
Court stated that the forced choice to forego fifth amendment protection in favor of exercising fourteenth amendment rights did not impair

invalidated the prosecution's use of the defendant's testimony from the pretrial motion to
suppress the evidence. 390 U.S. at 394. The defendant had asserted his possessory interest in the
item seized in order to have standing to bring the motion. Id. at 389-93. Thereafter, the
prosecution used this testimony at trial to prove his guilt. Id. at 389. The defendant in Simmons
was forced to choose between the assertion of his fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and his fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. Id. at
391-92. The Court found "intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another." Id. at 394.
3o 402 U.S. at 213. The McGautha Court refused to apply Simmons and stated:
[T]o the extent that [Simmons] was based on a "tension" between constitutional
rights and the policies behind them, the validity of that reasoning must now be
regarded as open to question, and it certainly cannot be given the broad thrust
which is attributed to it by Crampton in the present case.
Id. at 212-13. The McGautha Court relied on Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In
Brady, a defendant challenged the validity of a kidnapping statute which provided for imposition of the death sentence only after a jury trial, while providing life imprisonment as the
maximum penalty if there was no jury trial. Id. at 744. After waiving the jury trial and pleading
guilty, Brady maintained that the effect of the statute's death penalty provision was to coerce his
guilty plea and to induce the waiver of his sixth amendment right to trial by jury. Id. at 746. The
Supreme Court rejected Brady's argument, stating that "[a]lthough Brady's plea of guilty may
well have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death penalty, we are convinced
that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently made and we have no reason to doubt that his
solemn admission of guilt was truthful." Id. at 758. But see United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968) (death sentence provisions of federal statute unconstitutional because of inherent
tensions placed on fifth and sixth amendments).
The Court failed to directly support its position that it does not offend the Constitution to
force citizens to choose one constitutional right over another. The Court's discussion of Simmons
and the limitations McGautha places upon Simmons is the closest the Court comes to addressing
the forced choice issue.
In Simmons, the Court defined the issue as one of a waiver of a constitutional right. This
approach does not properly define the constitutional dilemma which Crampton faced. Crampton was not making a knowing and intelligent waiver; rather, he was forced to choose between
foregoing either his fifth or his fourteenth amendment protections. A waiver, on the other hand,
exists only when the petitioner can assert a constitutional protection. See, e.g., United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
31 402 U.S. at 213.
32 Id. at 215 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964)).
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held
the policy behind the fifth amendment. 33 The Court, therefore,
34
required.
constitutionally
not
were
procedures
that bifurcated
35
B. Furman v. Georgia

After the McGautha Court had firmly established the constitutionality of standardless jury discretion in death penalty cases, 36 the
Supreme Court proceeded in Furman, to vacate three death sentences 37 which had been imposed in accordance with the McGautha
rationale. 38 Five members of the Court 39 joined in a one paragraph
per curiam opinion, holding that "the imposition and carrying out of
the death penalty," in the three consolidated cases would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. 40 The command of Furman was un-

Id. at 213-22.
11 Id. at 221. The Court conceded that bifurcated procedures and clearly defined standards
were probably superior procedures to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed.
Id.; see Model Penal Code § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Despite these considerations
the Court stated, however, that "the Federal Constitution, . . . does not guarantee trial procedures that are the best of all worlds, or that accord with the most enlightened ideas of students of
the infant science of criminology." 402 U.S. at 221.
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
" See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
17 Three cases were consolidated for the opinion in Furman. Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790,
171 S.E.2d 501 (1969), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972);
Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969), rev'd per curiam, 408 U.S. 238 (1972);
Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The defendants in Branch and Jackson had been convicted of rape
and sentenced to death while the defendant in Furman had been convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. 408 U.S. at 239 (per curiam).
11 408 U.S. at 240 (per curiam). The death sentences in these three cases were imposed by
juries which were not required to examine aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. at 240
(Douglas, J., concurring).
" The five members of the Court were: Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart,
Justice White, and Justice Marshall.
11 408 U.S. at 239 (per curiam). The Court indicated that imposition of the death penalty in
these cases was cruel and unusual punishment violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. The Court's reliance on the eighth amendment was clear since it provides, in part,
that "cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. It is
unclear whether the Court's reliance on the fourteenth amendment was premised on an equal
protection theory, a due process incorporation theory, or a substantive due process theory. See
Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (per curiam); id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("basic theme of
equal protection is implicit in 'cruel and unusual punishments' "); id. at 257 & n.1 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (cruel and unusual punishment clause applicable to states via due process clause of
fourteenth amendment); id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("No one has yet suggested a
rational basis that could differentiate in those terms the few who die from the many who go to
prison"); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments
. . . applicable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment"); id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
13
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clear; 4 1 thus, the opinion created considerable confusion as to whether
the death penalty was per se unconstitutional or whether only certain
death penalty statutes were unconstitutional .42
43
C. Gregg v. Georgia

In Gregg, the Supreme Court examined the Georgia capital punishment statute enacted in response to Furman's equivocal command. 44 Gregg sounded the death knell for an eighth amendment
challenge 45 to the death penalty as per se violative of the cruel and

unusual punishment clause. 46 The plurality relied on three factors in
finding the Georgia death penalty statute constitutional: 1) the sub-

freakishly imposed"); id. at 359 n.141 (Marshall, J., concurring) (cruel and unusual punishment
analysis parallels substantive due process analysis; when state seeks to deprive individual of
fundamental right, it must meet compelling state interest test). For a detailed discussion of the
death penalty and equal protection, see Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773, 1790 (1970).
41 Although Furman's command was unclear, its effect was direct and perspicuous: Six
hundred persons on death rows throughout the country had their sentences vacated. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring).
42 The response to Furman demonstrated the confusion it created. Some state legislatures
interpreted Furman to require mandatory death sentences upon conviction. See Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) (plurality opinion). Other states did not reenact death penalty legislation after their
statutes were invalidated. CompareN.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-4 (West 1969) (invalidated in part
by State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972)) with N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1982). Other states interpreted Furman to require sentencing standards.
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
44 Id. at 188 (plurality opinion). On the same day the Court decided Gregg, it also decided
four other death penalty cases. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(Louisiana death penalty statute enacted after Furman); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (North Carolina death penalty statute enacted after Furman);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Texas death penalty statute enacted after
Furman); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Florida death penalty
statute enacted after Furman).
45 Prior to Furman, the Court had been reluctant to address whether the death penalty
violated the eighth amendment. See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 40, at 1775. The
plurality in Gregg recognized that there were few emphatic statements declaring the constitutionality of the death penalty. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69 (plurality opinion) ("Court [has]
never confronted [whether death penalty] .. .always . .. is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Constitution").
16 428 U.S. at 187-88 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated: "We hold that the death
penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances
of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure
followed in reaching the decision to impose it." Id. at 187.
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stantive limits placed upon any penalty by the eighth amendment; 41
2) an assessment of contemporary values concerning the penalty; 4
and 3) the presumption of a punishment's validity. 49 Emphasizing that
there was no requirement that state legislatures adopt the least severe
punishment, 50 the plurality stated that consideration of these factors
51
required a finding that the death penalty was not unconstitutional.
The plurality did not hold, however, that all death penalty statutes
were constitutional.5 2 Instead, the plurality deemed it necessary to
examine the specific death penalty statutes before deciding on their
constitutionality.
The Gregg plurality upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia
death penalty statute,5 3 maintaining that the Georgia Legislature's
development of standards to be used for sentencing decisions eliminated the constitutional infirmity of the statutes condemned in Furman. 54 The plurality stated that the concerns of Furman could be met

47 Id. at 172 (plurality opinion); see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)
(although imprisonment is not cruel and unusual punishment, imprisonment of narcotics addict
inflicts "cruel and unusual punishment in violation of fourteenth amendment" since punishment
is not proportional to crime).
48 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion).
The plurality observed that society had readily
endorsed the death penalty. Id. at 179 (plurality opinion); see id. at 179 n.23 (listing 35 state
statutes providing for death penalty); id. at 180 (plurality opinion) (noting federal statute
providing for death penalty); id. at 181 (plurality opinion) (noting California referendum to
amend state constitution to permit capital punishment).
41 Id. at 175 (plurality opinion). The plurality stressed that a defendant "who would attack
the judgment of the representatives of the people" as evidenced by legislation creating a death
penalty had to carry a heavy burden to invalidate the will of the people. Id.; cf. Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) ("Courts must not consider the wisdom of statutes but neither can they
sanction as being merely unwise that which the Constitution forbids"); Gore v. United States,
357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (courts are powerless to enter domain of penology). But cf. infra note
67.
o 428 U.S. at 175 (plurality opinion).
5' See supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text.
52 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion).
11 428 U.S. at 206-07 (plurality opinion). Three of the five death penalty statutes considered
on the same day as Gregg were also upheld. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (Louisiana statute which provided that death sentence was mandatory upon
conviction for first degree murder invalidated and first degree murder was specifically defined to
include certain types of murder); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (North Carolina statute which provided that death penalty was mandatory upon
conviction for first degree murder invalidated); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (Texas statute which defined five circumstances for which the death penalty could be
imposed and provided for separate sentencing hearing where jury was required to answer three
questions upheld); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Florida statute
which provided for two phase proceeding in which eight aggravating and seven mitigating
circumstances were weighed by the jury in formulation of advisory verdict to judge upheld).
-1 428 U.S. at 206 (plurality opinion). The McGautha Court rejected the use of standards for
sentencing decisions. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. The Furman Court invali-
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by "a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance." ' 55 The statute contained a list of aggravating circumstances defining conditions under
which the death penalty may be imposed. 5 While the Court had
dated death sentences which were imposed by juries using standardless discretion. See supra note
38 and accompanying text. Therefore, the conflict regarding standards to guide sentencing
discretion had to be resolved. The Court would have to define what was constitutionally
required for a death penalty statute and the Gregg plurality recognized this need. 428 U.S. at
158 (plurality opinion).
55 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion).
51 Upholding the aggravating circumstances selected, the plurality reasoned that the Georgia
Legislature's selection process for aggravation was the result of a careful analysis of those who
could be deterred. Id. at 196-98 (plurality opinion). But see ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL
WARREN CONF. ON ADVOCACY IN THE U.S., THE PENALTY OF DEATH: FINAL REPORT 60-107
(1980), reprinted in Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Evaluation of the Moral Bases for
CapitalPunishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177 (1981) (argument rejecting deterrence theory). The
aggravating circumstances contained in the Georgia statute were:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder
was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive
criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a
weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his
official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or
another.
GA. CODE. ANN. § 27.2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975), reprinted in 428 U.S. at 165 n.9 (plurality
opinion). The plurality emphasized that subsection (b)(7) would have to be construed narrowly
to meet constitutional requirements. 428 U.S. at 201 (plurality opinion). Rejecting the petitioner's over-breadth argument, the plurality stated that "there is no reason to assume that the
Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction." Id. But see Godfrey v.
State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
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previously rejected such sentencing standards, 57 the Gregg plurality
viewed the aggravating circumstances as a mechanism to eliminate
arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty. 58 The Georgia
statute provided that aggravating circumstances were to be proved by
the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt and then balanced by the
jury against mitigating circumstances in its determination of the sen9
tence to be imposed'
The constitutional framework which the plurality created
through the approval of the Georgia statute required a bifurcated trial
proceeding. 60 This proceeding required that the jury,6' after receiving
instructions on balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
render a sentence to be imposed at the second stage of the proceeding.62 Georgia's requirement that the jury list the aggravating circum" See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. The standards of aggravation adopted by
Georgia resembled the Model Penal Code standards which had been rejected in McGautha. The
approval of the use of standards compelled the reconciliation of McGautha and Gregg. See 428
U.S. at 195 n.47 (plurality opinion). Distinguishing McGautha as a fourteenth amendment case
and not an eighth amendment case, the plurality asserted that standardless jury sentencing
procedures were not employed in McGautha so as to violate the due process clause. Id. Therefore, the plurality suggested that the petitioners' death sentences in McGautha should be upheld
despite Furman.
428 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated:
These procedures require the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and the
criminal before it recommends sentence. No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance
or direction, decide whether he should live or die.
Id.
The plurality observed that the aggravating circumstances of the Model Penal Code "provide[d] guidance to the sentencing authority and thereby reduce[d] the likelihood that [a jury]
will impose" a capricious or arbitrary sentence. Id. at 193-95 (plurality opinion). Since the
Georgia statute and the Model Penal Code were strikingly similar, it was inevitable that the
Georgia statute would be upheld. See id. at 206 (plurality opinion). Compare MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.6(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), reprinted in McGautha, 402 U.S. at 222 app.
224 (list of aggravating circumstances) with CA. CODE ANN. § 27.2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975) (adopting eight of ten aggravating circumstances from Model Penal Code).
428 U.S. at 196-97 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 190-91 (plurality opinion). The plurality observed that although "a bifurcated
system is more likely to ensure elimination of . . . constitutional deficiencies," bifurcated proceedings were not constitutionally required. See id. at 190-93 (plurality opinion). The plurality
intimated that bifurcation was preferable because information relevant to the issue of punishment but prejudicial to the guilt determination process could be admitted at the second stage of a
bifurcated proceeding. Id.
"1 The plurality emphasized the importance of having the jury sentence the defendant. Id. at
190 (plurality opinion). The purpose of having the jury impose the sentence is " 'to maintain a
link between contemporary community values and the penal system-a link without which the
determination of punishment could hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.' " Id. (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519
n.15 (1967) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
62 See id. at 192-97 (plurality opinion). The plurality emphasized the importance of an
adequately instructed jury, stating that the inherent problems in jury sentencing, although not
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stances present was determined by the plurality to provide the necessary record for meaningful appellate review.6 3 Further, the plurality
acknowledged that the Georgia statute's automatic appellate review
64
provisions provided a safeguard against arbitrary death sentences.
The plurality held that in the aggregate these appellate safeguards
freed the sentencing decision from arbitrariness. 65 Nevertheless, the
jury retained discretion to decide who would receive the death sentence. 6 The plurality, however, did not view this jury discretion as
promoting arbitrary and capricious decisions. On the contrary, it
viewed this discretion as promoting more guided decisions. 7
D. ConstitutionalRequirements at the Penalty Proceeding
After the Gregg plurality had expressly established the constitutionality of death as a punishment, the Supreme Court focused on the
processes employed in imposing the penalty.68 In order to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, the process of imposing the death sentence had
to promote enhanced reliability.6 9 In Gardnerv. Florida,70 the plural-

totally correctable, can be alleviated if a jury is properly instructed and informed. Id. at 192
(plurality opinion).
63 Id. at 195 (plurality opinion).
14 Id. at 198 (plurality opinion).
o3 Id.
66 Id. at 197-98 (plurality opinion).
67 Id. at 206-07 (plurality opinion). In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(plurality opinion), the plurality confronted the tension created by McGautha and Furman-an
elimination of arbitrariness without standards. The obvious solution-mandatory sentencingwas rejected by the plurality. The plurality stated that mandatory sentencing "treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a
faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death." Id.
at 304 (plurality opinion). The plurality maintained "that in capital cases the fundamental
respect for humanity . . .requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense" before the death sentence can be
constitutionally imposed. Id. (citation omitted); accord Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976) (plurality opinion).
68 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982) (death sentence invalidated because
sentencing process excluded relevant mitigating evidence); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (death sentence invalidated because statutory sentencing process excluded
relevant mitigating evidence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (death
sentence invalidated because statutory sentencing process excluded relevant mitigating evidence); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion) (death sentence invalidated
because sentencing process did not meet requirements of due process).
6I In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion), the plurality
stated:
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative
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ity adopted specific constitutional requirements for the sentencing
trial. 7' The Gardner plurality stated that because of the ultimate
distinction that exists between death and every other form of punishment, it is essential that both the trial and the sentencing process meet
the demands of reason and the due process clause. 72 The plurality,
therefore, maintained that both procedural and substantive due pro73
cess elements had to be satisfied.
In Lockett v. Ohio,74 a plurality of the Court invalidated an Ohio
statutory scheme which limited the amount of mitigating evidence
which a jury could consider before imposing the death sentence. 75 The
Lockett plurality stated that preventing the sentencer from giving
"independent mitigating weight" to the mitigating circumstances
"creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors which may call for a less severe penalty." 76 In order to satisfy
constitutional requirements, concluded the plurality, the sentencer
must consider all relevant mitigating circumstances when determining
77
whether to impose the death penalty.

difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriatepunishment in a specific case.
Id.at 305 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
70 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion).
11 See id. at 355-56 (plurality opinion); supra note 69. The plurality rejected the use of a
presentence report to impose the death sentence when the defendant had not been given a copy
of the report and had no opportunity to refute the allegations therein. 430 U.S. at 360-62
(plurality opinion); cf. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1980) (defendant must be warned of rights
before allowing psychiatrist to speak with him if psychiatric testimony will be used to seek death
penalty). But cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (death penalty imposed on basis of
presentence report affirmed although report had not been shared with defendant, but defendant
was permitted to rebut report after judge read relevant section aloud).
72 430 U.S. at 357-58 (plurality opinion); cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (due
process protections available at hearing in which sentence may be imposed); Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736 (1948) (sentencing stage is critical stage in criminal proceeding). The Gardner
plurality maintained that a majority of the Court had agreed that death was a different kind of
punishment. To gain this 'majority,'" the plurality aggregated the separate opinions (including
concurrences and dissents) of five Justices in two different cases: Gregg and Furman. See
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357 (plurality opinion).
73 The plurality did not maintain, however, that the entire spectrum of due process rights
was required. It noted that the question of what process is due must be answered in accordance
with the demands of each particular situation. Id. at 358 n.9 (plurality opinion) (construing
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
74 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
75 id. at 608 (plurality opinion); accord Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (plurality opinion).
76 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
77 Id. at 608 (plurality opinion). The Lockett plurality recognized that the " 'character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense [are] a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.' " Id. at 601 (quoting
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion)); cf. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982)
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In Godfrey v. Georgia,78 four members of the Court 79 joined in a
plurality opinion invalidating a death sentence because the Georgia
Supreme Court had construed one of Georgia's statutory aggravating
circumstances too broadly. 0 The plurality determined that since this
broad statutory construction would encompass all murders, Georgia
had impermissibly expanded the scope of the statute beyond the constitutional requirement that the statute operate to distinguish the few
murders for which the death penalty is appropriate from the many for
which it is not."' Moreover, the plurality intimated that certain mitigating circumstances had not been adequately balanced against the
aggravating circumstances. 8 2 This failure to balance adequately, postulated the plurality, resulted in an unfair imposition of the death
sentenceA.3 To satisfy constitutional scrutiny, all mitigating evidence
84
must be balanced against all aggravating evidence.
In Bullington v. Missouri,15 the Supreme Court held that the
penalty proceeding, during which mitigating and aggravating circumstances are balanced, was a separate trial 8 with binding decisions
(death sentence vacated because jury did not attach sufficient mitigating weight to defendant's
relatively minor role in murder); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982) (death sentence
vacated because trial court failed to consider emotional disturbance of 16-year-old youth).
18 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion).
79 Justice Stewart, who authored the opinion of the Court, was joined by Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Stevens. Id. at 422 (plurality opinion).
80 Id. at 432 (plurality opinion). The aggravating circumstance found to exist is codified at
subsection (b)(7) of the Georgia statute. This subsection defines aggravation as a murder which
"was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." GA. CODE § 27-2534.1 (1978), reprinted in 446
U.S. at 422 (plurality opinion). The defendant in Godfrey killed his wife and mother-in-law by
firing a single shotgun shell into each victim's head. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that each offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman." 446 U.S. at 426
(plurality opinion).
81 446 U.S. at 433 (plurality opinion).
82 See id. The plurality observed that relevant mitigating circumstances which were not
considered included the following: The defendant's "victims were killed instantaneously"; the
defendant suffered emotional trauma caused by his victims; and he accepted responsibility for
the crimes. Id.
11 Id. The plurality found it vitally important to both the defendant and the community that
a sentence of death be and appear to be the result of reason and not of caprice and emotion. Id.
14 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (plurality opinion); Woodson,
428 U.S. at 304 (plurality
opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion); cf. Zant v. Stephens, 102 S.Ct. 1856 (1982)
(question certified to Georgia Supreme Court inquiring why Georgia death penalty statute was
interpreted to allow death sentence when one of statutory aggravating circumstances found to
exist by the jury was declared unconstitutional).
8 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
88 See id. at 438-39. The Court examined characteristics of the sentencing proceeding and
determined that the sentencing proceeding was in fact a trial. Id. The characteristics that were
statutorily prescribed were: counsel makes opening statements, testimony is taken, evidence is
presented, jury instructions are given, final arguments are made, and jury deliberations result
before a sentence is imposed. Id. at 438 n.10.
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which could not be disturbed even if the initial proceeding determining guilt results in a mistrial. 87 The Court observed that the Missouri
statute required that the aggravating circumstances be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. 88 In so doing, the Court recognized that the
magnitude of the defendant's interest demands the protection of these
interests by such a great standard of proof.8 9 The Court stated that
" 'our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.' "90
The Bullington Court, therefore, accorded the sentencing proceeding
in death penalty cases a significance not previously recognized.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT ACT

A. Overview
Consistent with the Supreme Court plurality opinions approving
standards and procedures to impose the death penalty, the New Jersey
Legislature enacted the Capital Punishment Act (the Act) which became effective August 6, 1982. 91 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3 provides
and has defined both
for bifurcated trial proceedings 92 in capital cases
94
aggravating 93 and mitigating circumstances.

" See id. at 438-46. The Court distinguished United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117
(1981). It maintained that although the bifurcated proceeding at issue in DiFrancesco was used
to enhance the defendant's sentence, the proceeding, unlike the Bullington bifurcated proceeding, was not de novo and the DiFrancescosentencing judge, unlike the Bullington sentencer, was
not limited to the disparate sentencing choice between life or death. 451 U.S. at 440.
8

451 U.S. at 441.

89 Id.
90 Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979)).
"I N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1982) (editor's commentary).
92 Id. § 2C: 11-3(c)(1) provides: "The court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death." The New Jersey Rules of
Evidence will apply at the penalty phase of the bifurcated proceeding. An earlier version of the
death penalty statute provided that the rules of evidence would be relaxed for the defendant's
introduction of any mitigating evidence. Capital Punishment Act, ch. 111, § 1, 1982 N.J. Sess.
Law Serv. 417, 419 (West) (deleted from Act by Senate Committee amendments adopted
Mar. 1, 1981). The Senate Judiciary Committee deleted this material because the committee
"felt that inclusion of this provision could have led to the introduction by the defense of totally
irrelevant material solely as a delaying tactic." Senate Judiciary Comm., 200th Leg., 1st Sess.,
Statement to Senate No. 112, at 2 (Bill Statement 1982) [hereinafter cited as Bill Statement].
Accordingly, since the provisions providing for the nonapplicability of the rules of evidence has
been deleted and there is no language indicating a contrary intent, it is fair to assume that the
rules of evidence apply at the penalty trial.
" See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(c)(4). The aggravating factors which the jury may consider
in deciding whether to impose the death penalty are whether:
(a) The defendant has previously been convicted of murder;
(b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created
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B. Bifurcated Trials
The bifurcated trial requires two distinct proceedings within the
single murder trial. 5 The first proceeding mirrors the traditional
adversarial proceeding determining guilt.96 The second proceeding is
a penalty phase proceeding during which the parties present to the

a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;
(c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;
(d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in
expectation of the receipt of any thing of pecuniary value;
(e) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of
payment of anything of pecuniary value;
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension,
trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or
another;
(g) The offense was committted while the defendant was engaged in the commission
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit
robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping; or
(h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in 2C:27-1, while the
victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the
victim's status as a public servant.
Id.
o See id. § 2C:11-3(c)(5). The mitigating factors which the jury may consider in deciding if
the death penalty is warranted are whether:
(a) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(b) The victim solicited, participated in or consented to the conduct which resulted
in his death;
(c) The age of the defendant at the time of the murder;
(d) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the
result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to
constitute a defense to prosecution;
(e) The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute
a defense to prosecution;
(f) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(g) The defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of
another person for the crime of murder; or
(h) Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the
circumstances of the offense.
Id.
9 See Comment, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 50 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Two-Trial System]; Comment, The Constitutionalityand Desirability of Bifurcated Trials and Sentencing Standards, 2 SErON HALL L. REV. 427 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Constitutionalityof Bifurcated Trials]. See generally Comment,
The California Penalty Trial, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 386 (1964) (benefits of bifurcation when
sentencing); Study of the CaliforniaPenalty Jury in First Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 1297 (1969) (empirical research conducted on the bifurcated and unitary systems) [hereinafter cited as Comment, CaliforniaPenalty].
96 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(1).
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jury aggravating and mitigating circumstances so that the jury may
weigh these factors and determine whether aggravation outweighs
mitigation. 97 The court will then impose a sentence consistent with the
jury's verdict. 8
The penalty phase proceeding commences after the judge or jury
has rendered a guilty verdict or the defendant has entered a guilty
plea. 99 The sentencer will then weigh the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in the sentencing process.100 The use of the bifurcated
trial is not new. 0 1 Bifurcated trials serve two functions. First, the
defendant can assert his fifth amendment privilege not to testify at the
guilt determining stage while preserving his right to testify at the
penalty phase prior to sentencing. 102 This procedure was followed to
ensure more reliable sentencing decisions. Second, bifurcation provides the prosecution with the opportunity to introduce into evidence
proof of prior crimes.10 3 With the advent of statutorily defined aggra-

Id. § 2C:11-3(c)(3).
98 Id.
19 Id. § 2C:11-3(c)(1).
100 Id. The Act provides in pertinent part:
Where the defendant has been tried by a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by
and before the jury which determined the
the judge who presided at the trial
defendant's guilt except that, for good cause, the court may discharge that jury and
conduct the proceeding before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding.
Where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or has been tried without a jury,
the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who accepted the defendant's plea or
who determined the defendant's guilt and before a jury empaneled for the purpose of
the proceeding. On motion of the defendant and with consent of the prosecuting
attorney the court may conduct a proceeding without a jury.
id.
for good cause. Id. The drafters cited an
A new jury may be empaneled for the penalty trial
illness
of the defendant which would result ina "lengthy delay" as an example of good cause. Bill
Statement, supra note 92, at 1.
have been used for over 20 years. See Comment, The Two-Trial System,
101 Bifurcated trials
supra note 95, at 58 (California, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania have employed
bifurcated systems in capital cases). Furthermore, bifurcated trials had been used prior to the
development of sentencing standards in capital cases. See Comment, California Penalty, supra
note 95, at 1297 (California, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas provided bifurcated trials without sentencing standards).
102 See Comment,
Constitutionality of Bifurcated Trials, supra note 95, at 428 (unitary
proceeding "forces a defendant to choose between his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights
against self-incrimination and his fourteenth amendment right to be heard"); see also supra notes
25-34 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 13A-5-40 (Michie Supp. 1981) (murder by defendant who
has been convicted of any other murder in the 20 years preceding the crime defined as aggravating circumstance provided that murder meets current definition under statute); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(a) (Bradford-Robinson 1978) (previous murder conviction defined as aggravating circumstance); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West Cum. Supp. 1982) (two or
more state offenses or federal offenses punishable by more than one year imprisonment and
97
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vating circumstances under the Gregg rationale, bifurcation operates
as an expedient to allow evidence of prior crimes to be introduced,
although this evidence would have been inadmissible at the defendant's guilt trial. 0 4 While the Supreme Court has distinguished the
introduction of prior crimes evidence at the guilt trial from the punishment trial, 105 the New Jersey Supreme Court has been reluctant to
ignore the prejudicial impact of this evidence regardless of whether
the trial is limited to capital sentencing. 06 In State v. Forcella,0 7 the
court recognized that because bifurcated proceedings permitted this
evidence to be introduced, bifurcation was not unequivocally better
for defendants. 10 Indeed, when prior crimes evidence is admitted, the
likelihood that the death penalty will be imposed is enhanced. 09

which involved serious bodily injury defined as aggravating circumstance); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921, 141(5)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1983) (previous capital felony or felony involving use or threat
of violence defined as aggravating circumstance). But see DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 4209 (Michie
Cum. Supp. 1982) (prior conviction for murder is not defined as aggravating circumstance).
"0 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
Compare Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967) (prior crimes evidence generally
excluded at guilt trial unless "particularly probative in showing . . . intent, . . . malice, . . .
motive") and Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (although logically probative,
prosecution in its presentation of case-in-chief may not utilize specific criminal acts) with Gregg,
428 U.S. at 191-92 (plurality opinion) (prior crimes evidence admissible at penalty trial).
101See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
107 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Funicello v. New
Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) (mem.).
10s See id. at 288-89, 245 A.2d at 194-95. The court stated:
A few States use the bifurcated trial, so that the subject of punishment may be heard
after the jury has decided upon guilt. Some defendants may well fare better under
that plan. But if there were a separate hearing on punishment, the one-way street we
now have would likely be opened to the State too, and for many defendants that
would be devastating. We have serious doubts as to whether the bifurcated trial
would not worsen the lot of defendants as a group, and for that reason, wholly apart
from the question whether our statute is so phrased as to permit bifurcation, we have
been reluctant to act until some hard facts are available. If the prosecutor were now
free to offer everything relevant to punishment at the trial of guilt, defendants might
well gain from bifurcation, but, as we have said, that is not our scene; and it is in the
light of what we have that we hesitate to change without some clear evidence that
the bifurcated trial would be an improvement here.
Id. at 289, 245 A.2d at 195; accord State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 513, 242 A.2d 333, 344 (absent
express evidence that bifurcated trials do not prejudice defendants, "it would be 'loath to compel
unwilling defendants to submit to a procedure which is devised for their benefit but which may
be prejudicial in its application to a particular case' ") (quoting United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d
904, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966)), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 971 (1968); see also
infra notes 118 & 119 and accompanying text.
'o' See Comment, CaliJornia Penalty, supra note 95, at 1326. The Supreme Court has relied
on Gregg in determining that prior crimes evidence is admissible during the penalty trial. The
Gregg plurality stated:
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C. New Jersey's Selection of Aggravating Circumstances
The aggravating circumstances selected by the New Jersey Legislature" 0 mirror the aggravating circumstances selected by the Georgia Legislature which were challenged in Gregg."' Although the
Georgia statute withstood constitutional scrutiny, it is by no means
certain that New Jersey's statutory aggravating circumstances can
withstand a federal constitutional challenge.112 The Gregg plurality
stated that the legislatures, when drafting death penalty legislation,
should "evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own
local conditions [and determine] those crimes and those criminals for
which capital punishment is most probably an effective deterrent." 13
This process would ensure that the punishment "makes [a] measurable

Much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may have no
relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely prejudicial to a fair
determination of that question. This problem, however, is scarcely insurmountable.
Those who have studied the question suggest that a bifurcated procedure-one in
which the question of sentence is not considered until the determination of guilt has
been made-is the best answer.
428 U.S. at 190-91 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted). In Gregg, the plurality ignored the
prejudicial impact which prior crimes evidence can have on a jury which is deciding whether to
impose the death sentence. To support the argument that prior crimes evidence should be
admitted, the plurality cited Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), in which a conviction under
the Habitual Offenders Act was upheld although prior crimes evidence was admitted to support
the conviction and extend the term of the sentence. Id. at 568-79. The Gregg plurality's reliance
on Spencer, however, is specious since it has the effect of comparing a trial for the death penalty
with a trial for an extended term of years. Such a comparison ignores the command in Woodon
that the death penalty cannot be compared to a prison sentence, however long. See Woodson,
428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion).
110 See supra note 93.
Compare supra note 93 with supra note 56. Georgia's aggravating circumstances differ
from New Jersey's in that the Georgia statute defines rape and armed robbery as capital crimes
punishable by death when an aggravating circumstance is present. See GA. CODE ANN. §
27.2534.1 (Supp. 1975). In a post Gregg decision, four members of the Court held that the death
penalty was an excessive punishment for rape even when aggravating circumstances were
present. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). The Coker plurality stated:
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and the public, it does not compare with
murder which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or
even the serious injury to another person.
Id. at 598 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). A fortiori, imposition of the death penalty for
armed robbery is also excessive. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 205-06 (plurality opinion) (death
sentence upheld for murder while death sentence for armed robbery invalidated).
112In Gregg, the plurality emphasized that individual states must analyze their local conditions in drafting death penalty statutes which will withstand constitutional scrutiny. 428 U.S. at
186 (plurality opinion).
"' Id. (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 403-05 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
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contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is ... more
11 4
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering."
Therefore, the constitutionality of the New Jersey death penalty depends upon an assessment of deterrence statistics as they relate to New
Jersey in order to determine whether a "measurable contribution to
the acceptable goals of punishment" will be made. Although an analysis of deterrence statistics is required of legislatures drafting death
penalty statutes, there is no evidence that the New Jersey Legislature
performed this analysis in drafting the Capital Punishment Act. 1 5
Senator John Russo, one of the sponsors of the death penalty bill,
stated: "[I] have never attempted to justify the death penalty on an
empirical deterrence argument. It cannot be done."1 6 Since this evidence has not been presented, the Act cannot be justified as making a
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment. The discussion during the public hearings indicates that deterrence research
was not used to support the legislative decision to draft a death
1 7
penalty statute.

114 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). The Coker plurality
cited
Gregg in maintaining that punishment is excessive and unconstitutional when it is purposeless
and disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. Id.
15 The statement which accompanied the death penalty bill to the full Senate contained no
reference to the statistical analysis envisioned by the Gregg plurality. In fact, there is no
reference to deterrent effect. See Bill Statement, supra note 92; see also CapitalPunishment Act:
Hearings on S. 112 Before the N.J. Senate Judiciary Comm., 200th Legis., 2d Sess. 31 (1982)
(statement of Sen. Russo) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
"1 Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 31 (statement of Sen. John Russo made in response to
Mr. Stanley Van Ness, Public Defender of the State of New Jersey).
"I See id. Senator Russo, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, did not perceive a
requirement to justify the death penalty in such a manner.
Senator Russo: I will not argue because you can't prove that having a death penalty
will deter murders. I have a feeling that it will, but I can't prove it. I could not argue
that you are wrong. So, I simply say that when we-You might say, how many
murders would there have been of cops in New York had we had no death penalty.
Would there have been more? I don't know.
Mr. Van Ness: I am sorry to cut in. I suppose that what I am trying to suggest is that
there should be a burden on you and on those of you who favored your position to
demonstrate the utility, not the burden on me to demonstrate the reverse.
Senator Russo: Well, yes, Senator Vreeland says, "Why." I say, "Why," too. I don't
think there is anySenator Vreeland: Why do you make that statement?
Mr. Van Ness: Well, because you are now talking about passing an act that will
result at somewhere along the way in all probability in somebody's life being taken. I
think there ought to be somebody's clear justification for that. Now, if you have it in
your mind and you tell me you don't think it is deterrenceSenator Russo: I didn't say that. I said I can't prove it is a deterrent.
Mr. Van Ness: You can't prove those deterrents. You think there might be some
deterrent. If that satisfies enough of you, then by all means we will have a law. But,
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Additionally, the New Jersey Legislature selected the aggravating
circumstance of previous conviction for murder, despite the ruling of
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Forcella that prior crimes evidence
was inadmissible against a defendant even at the penalty stage of a
bifurcated proceeding in a capital case."" The court stated that "the
State may not prove a defendant's criminalrecordfor the purpose of a
jury's consideration of punishment.""" While the Federal Constitution may permit the introduction of prior crimes evidence into the
punishment phase of the bifurcated trial, the New Jersey Supreme
Court can decide this material is too prejudicial 2M and hold under
state constitutional law that its introduction into evidence violates the
2
due process clause of the New Jersey Constitution. '
Another troublesome area of the Capital Punishment Act is the
provision which designates as an aggravating circumstance that "[t]he
murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery
to the victim." 122 The New Jersey Legislature adopted this particular
aggravating circumstance verbatim from the Georgia death penalty
statute.123 This provision must be construed narrowly to meet consti-

in my judgment that isn't sufficient justification, and you ought to be sure that when
you do something as drastic as this thing that you are contemplating that you know
what you are doing. I say that respectfully.
Senator Russo: I think if we were to assume or agree with you on that, then, yes, it
would be a different situation. I don't think that it is a prerequisite to voting for the
death penalty, that I can be sure. You are dealing with human events. You are never
going to be sure. You have to make the judgment you think is right and hope that
you can live with it.
Id.

jig

Forcella, 52 N.J. at 288-89, 245 A.2d at 194-95.
19 Id. at 288, 245 A.2d at 194 (emphasis added).
121See State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 514, 242 A.2d 333, 344 (consideration of prior criminal
records on punishment alone is "inhumanely . ..death oriented"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 971
(1968).
121Cf. State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1333 (1982) (broader constitutional rights
granted under New Jersey Constitution than available under United States Constitution in area
of standing to challenge search and seizure); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980)
(broader constitutional rights granted under New Jersey Constitution than available under
United States Constitution in area of free speech); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66
(1975) (broader constitutional rights granted under New Jersey Constitution than available
under United States Constitution in area of consent searches). See generally Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Mosk, The
New States Rights, 10 CAL. J. LAw ENFORCEMENT 8 (1976).
122 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c).
123Compare id. with GA. CODE ANN. § 27.2534.1(b)(7) (Harrison 1983).
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tutional standards, 24 but New Jersey courts will be troubled in attempting to provide a consistent interpretation to this vague standard. 125 The failure to give notice of what conduct will be specifically
punishable with death constitutes a due process impairment.
D. New Jersey's Selection of Mitigating Circumstances
The mitigating circumstances in the Act 26 resemble those of the
Model Penal Code and the Florida statute which was upheld in Profitt
v. Florida.2 7 There is a constitutional requirement that the defendant
be permitted to introduce all mitigating evidence. 28 The Lockett
plurality stated:
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case,
not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that29 the defendant proffers as a basis for a

sentence less than death.

Although the sentencer must consider as mitigation "[a]ny other
factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to
the circumstances of the offense," 13 0 certain mitigating circumstances
selected by the New Jersey Legislature eviscerate protections afforded

124 See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 430-31 (plurality opinion) (provision includes only torture,
depravity of mind, or aggravated battery with specific definitions applying to each item); Gregg,
428 U.S. at 201 (plurality opinion) (provision cannot be given "open-ended construction").
See Holton v. State, 243 Ga. 312, 253 S.E.2d 736 (aggravating circumstance of death "by
reason of depravity of mind" present when shooting preceded by infliction of wounds with
kitchen knife, spear, and tomahawk), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979); Ruffin v. State, 243 Ga.
95, 252 S.E.2d 472 (shooting of 11 year old child in head found to be "horrible and inhuman"
thus aggravating circumstance), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292,
236 S.E.2d 637 (throwing of child off bridge into water resulting in drowning of child held to be
aggravating circumstance), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 960 (1977).
M2See supra note 92.
428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion). Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(5) with
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (Supp. 1976-1977) and MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). The New Jersey statute differs from the Florida statute and the Model Penal Code
in that it adds as a mitigating circumstance that "[tihe defendant rendered substantial assistance
to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder." N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C: 11-3(c) (5) (g).
121 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion).
129 Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original); cf. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979)
(per curiam) ("In these unique circumstances, 'the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically [during penalty trial] to defeat the ends of justice' ") (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). See generally Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified
Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1978).
130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(h).
115

M7
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defendants under prior law, expand the class of individuals now
susceptible to the death penalty, and circumvent commands of the
Supreme Court. The statute provides as a mitigating circumstance the
age of the defendant at the time of the murder, thus changing prior
law which had specifically prohibited imposing capital punishment
on youths.13 ' The New Jersey Legislature has circumvented the Supreme Court command that no limitation may be placed on the jury's
consideration and weighing of mitigation. This has been done by
providing that "unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution" is a mitigating circumstance. 32 Duress
is an affirmative defense 133 but it is insufficient to constitute an absolute defense to murder; rather it is an affirmative defense which
reduces murder to manslaughter. 3 4 A defendant who attempts to
establish duress will introduce such evidence at the guilt stage of the
murder trial in an effort to be found guilty of the lesser offense. If the
defendant is unsuccessful at the guilt stage, he will again introduce
evidence of duress at the penalty phase. "5 This presents a problem for
the defendant. The judge will instruct the jury that the mitigating
circumstance of duress requires a finding of "unusual and substantial
duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution." Having
already concluded that duress sufficient "to constitute a defense to
prosecution" was not present, the jury must then consider the defendant's evidence of duress for mitigation, cognizant that the evidence
must show that the duress was "unusual and substantial." Since the
duress defense for the murder charge does not require the "unusual
and substantial" standard, the jury will presume that the mitigating
factor of duress represents a higher threshold. If the defendant cannot
meet the lower threshold at the guilt trial, he will be unable to meet
the higher standard at the penalty trial. Therefore, a finding of "unu-

131

See State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954) (persons under age of 16 at time of

commission of crime could not receive capital sentence in New Jersey). See generally Bedau,
Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERs L. REv. 1 (1964).
132 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(e).
13 Id. § 2C:2-9(a) (West 1982) provides in pertinent part that:
[It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or threat to use,
unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
Id.
134 Id. § 2C:2-9(b) provides in pertinent part: "In a prosecution for murder, the [duress]
defense is only available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter."
131 Id. § 2C:11-3(c)(2) provides that "[t]he defendant shall have the burden of producing
evidence of the existence of any mitigating factors."
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sual and substantial" duress requires a conclusion contrary to the
verdict reached at the guilt trial.
Similarly, the legislature has circumvented the command of the
Supreme Court by providing that "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" is a mitigating circumstance. 13 At the guilt trial, "[e]vidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is
admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not
have a state of mind which is an element of the offense."' 1 37 The
defendant is required to prove this defect by a preponderance of the
evidence. 38 If the defendant fails to prove mental disease at the guilt
trial, he will be in a similar position at the penalty trial as the
defendant seeking to establish duress as a mitigating circumstance.
The same limitation on the jury's consideration and weighing exists
because the legislature has defined mental or emotional disturbance as
"extreme" in order to constitute a mitigating circumstance, thus connoting a higher threshold to establish mitigation. These inferential
results are contrary to the constitutional requirement that the jury
give independent consideration and weight to the defendant's mitigating evidence. 39 Therefore, the New Jersey Legislature's limitation of
duress as "unusual and substantial" and "mental or emotional disturbance as extreme" "creates the risk that the death penalty will be
40
imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty." 1
E. EstablishingAggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
at the Penalty Trial
In order to impose the death sentence, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt during the penalty trial that one of
the statutorily defined aggravating circumstances is present.' 41 If the
prosecution fails to make this showing, the defendant may be sentenced to thirty years imprisonment or life imprisonment with no
eligibility for parole for thirty years. 42 Conversely, if the defendant is
to avoid the death sentence after the prosecution has established the
existence of an aggravating circumstance, he must establish the exis-

136

Id. § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(a).

137 Id.

§ 2C:4-2.

Id.
139 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 68-84 and accompanying
text.
140 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
141 N.J. STA-r. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(2), (c)(3)(a).
141 Id.; § 2C:11-3(c)(3)(b); cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969) (all elements of crime must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt to comport with due process of law).
138
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tence of sufficient mitigation to outweigh the aggravating circumstance. 143
Under the Capital Punishment Act, the defendant bears the bur45
den of producing evidence'14 to establish mitigating circumstances.
The burden of persuasion 41 for mitigating circumstances, however, is
not defined in the Act.' 47 The legislative history of the Act reveals that
differing opinions concerning this burden were present. 48 In an earlier draft of the Capital Punishment Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee included a provision requiring the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. 4 This
requirement, however, was eliminated in anticipation of a constitutional challenge. 50 Concern was voiced that allocating the burden of
proof to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence would
require a quantum of mitigating evidence before the jury could find
the existence of a mitigating factor.' 5' The Attorney General's office
stated that the resulting effect would be that the defendant's evidence
of mitigation would be totally rejected if the jury found it insufficient
to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard. 52 Thus, the
defendant may have introduced mitigating evidence which the jury
would be precluded from giving independent mitigating weight be-

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(3)(b).
Id. § 2C:11-3(c)(2). N.J. R. EVID. 1 (5) defines the burden of producing evidence as "the
obligation of a party to introduce evidence when necessary to avoid the risk of a judgment or
peremptory finding against him on a material issue of fact.- See generally C. MCCOMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); 9 J. WIcMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2483 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
115 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(2).
"I In New Jersey the "[b]urden of proof is synonymous with the 'burden of persuasion.' " N.J.
R. EVID. 1(4). -"'Burden of proof' means the obligation of a party to meet the requirements of a
rule of law that the fact be proved either by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and
convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, as the case may be. " Id. See generally C.
McCoRMICK, supra note 144, §§ 336-338; 9 J. \VIcMoRE, supra note 144, §§ 2483-2489.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3.
"'
Compare Senate Hearings. supra note 115, at 11 (statement of Mr. Edwin Stier) ("The
defendant has no burden of proof on those mitigating factors") uwith id. at 12 (statement of Sen.
Russo) (original bill provided that "defendant had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence only on mitigating factors").
14' Capital Punishment Act, ch. 111, § 1, 1982 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 417. 419 (West) (proposed
bill).
150 See Senate Hearings. supra note 115, at 13 (statement of Mr. Edwin Stier).
Id. Preponderance of the evidence has been defined as the obligation to prove "that a
desired inference is more probable than not." NEW JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE comment 5 to N.J.
R. EVID. 1(4) (R. Biunno & F. Guarini eds. 1983). "If the evidence is in equipoise, the burden has
not been met." Id.
"I See Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 13 (statement of Mr. Edwin Stier).
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cause of the proposed burden of persuasion. 153 Due to an anticipated
Lockett challenge, 154 the burden of persuasion was totally eliminated
55
from the statute. 1
The legislative decision in New Jersey to eliminate a burden of
proof for mitigation was error, since the Supreme Court has stated
that the allocation of the burden of proof "may be decisive of the
outcome.' 56 The Supreme Court, therefore, has carefully reviewed
legislative decisions to allocate the burden of proof in criminal trials. 15 Authorities have recognized that rules "allocating and describing [the burden of proof] could not be discarded by a rational legal
system."' 581 These rules serve as a guide for juries in determining
whether certain facts exist. To illustrate, in circumstances in which
the evidence is insufficient, equivalent, or credible on both sides, the
jury will be unable to determine whether mitigating circumstances
exist. Constitutional considerations command that the burden of
proof must, at times,' 5 9 be assigned to the prosecution. 6 0 In In re
Winship,'' the Court held that the burden to prove every element of
the crime must be assigned to the prosecution. 6 2 The Court recognized that the due process clause required that " 'no man shall lose his
liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of. . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.' "163 Likewise, the burden to prove that
the defendant deserves the death sentence must be placed upon the
prosecution because no man should lose his life unless the government
has convinced the factfinder that there is insufficient mitigation.

1-3 See generally Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio
and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L.
REv. 317 (1981).
'
See supra notes 74-77, 129, 139 & 140 and accompanying text.
's
See Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 13 (statements of Mr. Edwin Stier, Sen. John
Russo).
"' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958). See generally Gillers, Deciding Who Dies,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 21 n.100 (1980); Liebman & Shephard, Guiding Capital Sentencing
Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate:" Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor,66 GEO. L.J. 757,
821 n.277 (1978).
' See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
158 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 144, § 336.
'5
See infra note 211.
'8
In addition to the constitutional significance of assigning a burden of proof to guide the
jury in its decisionmaking function, the burden aids the trial process itself. C. McCORMic K, supra
note 144, § 336.
61 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
16 Id.at 364.
"' Id. (quoting Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Futureof Juvenile Law, 1 FAM. L.Q.
1, 26 (1967) (omission in original)).
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Other provisions of the criminal code cannot be used to define the
burden of proof in the Capital Punishment Act. N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:1-13(d) provides:
When the application of the code depends upon the finding of a
fact which is not an element of an offense, unless the code otherwise provides:
(1) The burden of proving the fact is on the prosecution or defendant, depending on whose interest or contention will be furthered if
the finding should be made; and
(2) The fact must be 64proved to the satisfaction of the court or jury,
as the case may be. 1
To use this provision of the Code to supply the missing elements of the
Act would require that the state be viewed as the "party whose
interest is furthered" since the drafters of the Act clearly intended that
no burden of proof be placed upon the defendant. 65 The state's
interest at the penalty trial, however, is not imposing the death sentence, but is ensuring that justice is done. 6' Even if this provision
were used to supplement the Act, the resulting effect could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.1 67 Describing the level of proof to a jury
as proof to their satisfaction is so vague 68 that the jurors are likely to
develop their own standard of proof. 69 Additionally, the discretion
afforded by this provision gives the jury the type of untrammeled
discretion condemned in Furman. 70 Further, the legislative history of
this provision reveals that it was drafted for the express purpose of
broadening the discretion of the court. ' 71 Not since McGautha has the
discretion of the sentencing authority to impose the death sentence
been broadened. This provision, when used during the penalty trial,

614N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:1-13(d) (West 1982).

I's

See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
'16 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT EC 7-13 (1981).
1'7 Moreover, the legislative history indicates that the drafters did not intend to use this
provision of the criminal code to define the burden of proof. See Senate Hearings, supra note
115, at 11-13.
16" NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMM'N, 2 NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE: FINAL REPORT
39 (1971) ("[t]he standard of proof... i.e., that the fact 'be established to the satisfaction' of the
tribunal is intentionally ambiguous").
169 See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
17o See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
171 This provision was modeled after MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-13 (West 1982) (historical note). The commentary to this provision of
the Model Penal Code reveals that it was drafted to "broaden the discretion of the court." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.12 commentary at 108 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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therefore, actually reduces a criminal defendant's protections. 7 2 Ambiguous terms and reduced procedural protections cannot be utilized
when the state seeks to impose its most severe form of punishment
"different in both its severity and its finality." 173
Additionally, because the burden of proof is not defined in the
statute, the trial judge will not be required to instruct the jury regarding the standard of proof for mitigation. If jury instructions on mitigating circumstances are not provided, the defendant will be denied
the benefits which naturally arise therefrom. This is evident because
jury instructions have been recognized as: (1) explaining a party's
legal theory and the manner in which the evidence supports it;
(2) reinforcing the evidence in the minds of the jurors; and (3) cloaking the evidence with the court's authority by having the trial judge
discuss the evidence. 174
In Gregg, the plurality recognized that the jury was "unlikely to
be skilled in dealing with the information they are given."'115 The
problem created by an untrained jury making a capital sentencing
decision is alleviated, the plurality reasoned, by giving the jury guidance and instructions.176 Citing the standard practice of giving juries
"careful instructions on the law and how to apply it before they are
authorized to decide,"1 77 the plurality stated "[i]t would be virtually
unthinkable to follow any other course," 178 since jury instructions and
the guidance which they provide are the "hallmark of our legal sys17 9
tem."
The elimination of an evidentiary requirement for mitigation
from the Capital Punishment Act and consequential elimination of
jury instructions for mitigation denies a capital defendant due process

172 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 commentary at 108 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
("To the
extent that it permits a finding that will result in increase of sentence, upon less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is in terms less favorable to defendants").
173 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357 (plurality opinion). The plurality in Gardner stressed that "[t]he
defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may have no right to object to a particular result of the sentencing
process." Id. at 358 (plurality opinion).
'
Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 153, at 347.
7 428 U.S. at 192 (plurality opinion).
176

Id.

"' Id. at 193 (plurality opinion).
178 Id.; see Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931).
179 428 U.S. at 193 (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court has maintained that proper jury
instructions are critical to a fair trial and thus has overturned convictions for improper instructions. See, e.g., Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972).
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rights. 80 With no instruction on the standard of proof for establishing
mitigation, the jurors are provided no guidance on how to weigh the
defendant's evidence of mitigation and the prosecution's evidence
rebutting the existing mitigation. It is a reasonable assumption that
the individual jurors will place the burden of persuasion for mitigation on the defendant since the defendant has the burden of production and will benefit by proof of mitigation. 8" The defendant's mitigating evidence will be subjected to a standard of proof which
requires the defendant to introduce the greater weight of the evidence
in order to establish mitigating factors. This preponderance of the
evidence standard focuses the jurors' minds on the weight of the
evidence. 8 2 Yet, the quantity of evidence introduced is often a function of the resources available to a party. 83 The state, therefore, will
be in a better position to introduce the greater weight of the evidence
that mitigating circumstances were not present. Since the jury will
subject the mitigating evidence to a quantitative analysis, it will
conclude that mitigating circumstances are not present when in fact
they are. Thus, the defendant will receive the death sentence when
the jury rejects mitigating evidence which is insufficient in quantity.
8 4
This is precisely the harm sought to be eliminated by the drafters.
Without guidance, a jury cannot meet Gregg's constitutional
command that "sentencing procedures should not create 'a substantial
risk that the death penalty [will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.' "1185 Furthermore, the significance of mitigating
circumstances is effectively diminished because the defendant's evidence of mitigation will not receive any of the benefits flowing from
jury instructions.18 6 In contrast, the state's evidence supporting the
existence of aggravating circumstances will receive all of the benefits
flowing from jury instructions. The inference that aggravating cir-

8I Cf. Lockett, 430 U.S. at 606-07 (plurality opinion) (insufficient to permit defendant to

introduce all evidence of mitigation when death penalty statute operates as device placing
limitation on sentencing authority's evaluation of evidence).
"I' See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 144, § 336 ("[if no burden of proof were defined] the trier
of fact would itself assign a burden of persuasion, describing that burden as it saw fit by
substituting its own notions of policy for those now made available .. .as a matter of law").
182 Id. § 339.
83 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (state holds superior position in criminal
trial); see also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 206 A.2d 359
(1965).
'8 See Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 13 (statement of Mr. Edwin Stier).
, Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601 (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality
opinion)).
S See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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cumstances have a special significance which mitigating circumstances do not will be made easily. 8 7 The legal emphasis placed upon
aggravating evidence and corresponding de-emphasis placed on mitigating evidence will effect the jurors' assignment of weights to this
evidence." 8 Aggravating factors will be accorded an increased weight
while mitigating factors will be accorded a reduced weight. 89 Accordingly, a death sentence will be more likely "in spite of factors
0
which may call for a less severe penalty."19
The best method to insure that the defendant will not be prejudiced by the statute is to create a presumption concerning evidence of
mitigation.'91 The drafters of the Capital Punishment Act recognized
that the statute contained many elements of a presumption.192 Consequently, they considered creating a statutory presumption that "there
are no mitigating factors." 193 The drafters, however, misstated what
the presumption should be. The trial judge must instruct the jury that
the law presumes that the defendant does not deserve a death sentence
when evidence of mitigation is introduced. Creating a presumption
clearly shifts the burden of production on mitigation to the state once
the defendant introduces evidence of mitigation since the state must
now introduce evidence to rebut this presumption. 9 4 This shift of the
burden of production is effectively no different than the procedure for
establishing mitigation created by the Act. The statute provides that

"' See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 153, at 348. Hertz and Weisberg maintain that there
must be a counter-balance to any benefit which the prosecution receives. See id. at 348-49 &
nn.148, 151 (construing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 n.6 (1973)) ("This Court has
therefore been particularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits to
the State when the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant's ability to secure a fair
trial").
M88
Id. at 348-49.
I8
Id.
'g Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 74-77 and accompanying
text. See generally Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 153, at 346-50; Liebman & Shephard, supra
note 156, at 776.
181 A presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence and operates to assign the burden
of persuasion. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 144, § 342; see Doe v. City of Trenton, 75 N.J. 137,
380 A.2d 703 (1977) (per curiam), a/fg 143 N.J. Super. 128, 362 A.2d 1200 (App. Div. 1976).
See generally Ranney, Presumptions in Criminal Cases: A New Look at an Old Problem, 41
MONT. L. REV. 21 (1980).
112 Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 13-14 (statements of Mr. Edwin Stier, Sen. John
Dorsey).
193

Id.

"4 The right to jury instructions on a presumption when no rebuttal evidence is submitted by
the opposing party is generally accepted. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 144, § 345(A). When
there is rebuttal evidence submitted, there are diverging views whether jury instructions concerning the presumption are proper. See id.
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the defendant has the burden of production for mitigation, and in the
event the state wants to rebut the defendant's evidence, it can be
inferred that the state has a burden of production to produce evidence
95
of the absence of mitigation.
After. the production of mitigating evidence, instructing the jury
that the law presumes that the defendant does not deserve the death
sentence informs the jury of the legal importance of mitigating evidence, 96 and injects into the penalty trial the limiting principle that
death is a penalty reserved for few convicted murderers.' 9 7 This presumption additionally compels the state to prove the absence of mitigation or risk that the defendant's mitigation will be found as a matter
of law. 98 This is consistent with the legislative intent that the state
should not have to establish the absence of mitigation until the defendant introduces evidence of mitigation. 99 Allocating the burden of
proof for the absence of mitigation goes beyond the statute and its
legislative history, 200 however, it was the drafters' intent to place no
burden of proof on the defendant. 20 1 Since the reasons for defining a
burden of proof are compelling, and the drafters viewed the allocation
of the burden to the defendant as unconstitutional, the burden must
be placed on the state.
The state's burden of proof regarding the absence of mitigating
circumstances must meet the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
This presents a logical corollary to the drafters' intent that the state
must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . sufficient aggravating
factors to outweigh the mitigating factors. ' 20 2 In effect, requiring the
state to prove the absence of mitigation, is tantamount to requiring
the state to prove insufficient evidence of mitigation. In each instance,
the state will have to discredit the existence of mitigation. Since the
drafters intended that the state would be required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating

195See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(2). Although the Act does not specifically provide that
the burden of production shifts to the prosecution once the defendant has introduced mitigating
evidence, see id., the provision for rebuttal evidence has the same effect.
196 See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text; cf. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 144, § 342
(recognizing importance of jury instruction of presumption of innocence).
191See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601 (plurality opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality
opinion); Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
"I See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 518 (1979); see also C. McCoRMICK, supra note
144, § 342.
199 Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 13-14 (statement of Mr. Edwin Stier).
200 Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3.
201 Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 13 (statement of Mr. Edwin Stier).
202

Id. at 11.
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factors, 20 3 the drafters' have demonstrated an intent requiring the
same level of proof for the absence of mitigation.
Although the Supreme Court has never answered directly
whether the state is constitutionally required to prove the absence of
mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt in capital cases, 20 4 a recent
decision suggests this conclusion. In Bullington, a majority of the
Court recognized that in a penalty trial during which the jury decides
whether to impose the death sentence, " 'society imposes almost the
entire risk of error upon itself.' "205 The Court emphasized that " 'the
interests of the defendant are of such magnitude' " in a capital case,
" 'that . . . they [are] protected by standards of proof designed to

exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.' "206 The Court has recognized that the reasonable doubt standard is "indispensable" to inform the trier of fact of the need to reach a
state of certainty on the facts in issue. 20 7 A mistaken judgment which
20 8
operates to the disadvantage of the defendant is an intolerable error
and the Court has demonstrated a willingness to accept error only
when it operates to the defendant's advantage. 20 9 Thus, the requirement that the possibility of error be reduced is, in essence, a guideline
for the allocation of the burden of proof as well as a mandate that the
reasonable doubt standard be applied. Furthermore, the Court has
found untenable a state's attempt to use the same standard of proof in
a criminal case as would suffice in a civil case since in a criminal case a
defendant's liberty is at stake. 210 A fortiori, when the defendant's life is
at stake, there are even more compelling reasons to use the most
stringent standard of proof. 21 Therefore, although the reasonable

203 Id. at 11 (statement of Mr. Edwin Stier) ("What we have tried to do is establish the State's
burden beyond a reasonable doubt, to establish sufficient aggravating factors to outweigh the
mitigating factors which exist").
204 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 609 n.16 (plurality opinion).
205 Bullington, 451 U.S. at 441 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979)); see
also supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text; cf. Note, A Hidden Issue of Sentencing: Burdens
of Proof for Disputed Allegations in Presentence Reports, 66 GEo. L.J. 1515, 1534 (1978)
(placing burden of persuasion on prosecution will lead to more appropriate sentencing decisions).
200 Bullington, 451 U.S. at 441 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979)).
The reasonable doubt standard has a history of use whenever the risk of error is sought to be
reduced. See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
207 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; cf. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) (mandating that
sentencing proceeding be more reliable).
201 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
209Id.
210 Id. at 363.
211 But cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 209 (1977) (state's recognition of mitigating
circumstances to lessen degree of criminality or punishment "does not require the State to prove
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doubt standard may place a heavy burden on the state, fundamental
fairness mandates that the state bear this burden of proof.
F. The Denial of Mercy
The Act eliminates the discretion of the jury to impose mercy in
capital cases. "If the jury . . . finds that any aggravating factor exists

and is not outweighed by one or more mitigating factors, the court
shall sentence the defendant to death.

' 21 2

If an aggravating circum-

stance is found to exist and mitigating circumstances are found to be
insufficient or totally lacking, there is no provision in the statute
permitting the jury to use discretion and recommend a life sentence.
In Gregg, the Supreme Court stated that it would be unconstitutional
to prohibit the use of discretion for mercy from the determination of
guilt to executive clemency. 21 3 The Court specifically stated that the
power of the jury to find the defendant guilty of a lesser crime to
214
prevent exposure to the death penalty is constitutionally protected.
In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently restated the
principle that "a jury has the prerogative of returning a verdict of
innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt.

' 21 5

If the

jury is permitted to decide against the weight of the evidence as to
guilt or innocence, then their power to recommend a life sentence
rather than the death penalty is unquestionable. This constitutional
principle, recognized by the United States 21 6 and New Jersey2 17 Suits nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would be too
cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate") (footnote omitted).
Patterson, however, can be distinguished from a death penalty trial. First, the mitigation
discussed in Patterson involved an affirmative defense which operated to reduce the degree of the
crime. Mitigation in a death penalty case does not have this effect. Further, the Patterson Court
partially based its decision to reject disproof of mitigating evidence on the recognition that the
state legislatures would abandon the use of affirmative defenses if this requirement were imposed. Id. at 209 n.l, 211 n.12, 214 n.15. Such an argument could not be made in death
penalty cases, since consideration of mitigation is constitutionally required. Lockett, 438 U.S. at
605 (plurality opinion). Additionally, the Patterson Court stated that this burden of proof was
not required because it would increase the likelihood that some guilty defendants would go free.
432 U.S. at 209. This argument is inapplicable in a bifurcated death penalty trial where guilt has
already been determined. The effect of the allocation of the burden would be that more
defendants would receive life imprisonment rather than the death penalty.
212
213

N.J . STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(3)(a) (emphasis added).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50 (plurality opinion). See generally Liebman & Shephard, supra

note 156.
214 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50.
216 State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 212, 432 A.2d 912, 916 (1981).
216 See United States v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
217 See State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 432 A.2d 912 (1981). The New Jersey Supreme Court
has cloaked this principle with the added protection of an interpretation of the state constitution.
See id. See generally supra notes 120 & 121 and accompanying text.
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preme Courts, derives from the "belief that the jury in a criminal
prosecution serves as the conscience of the community and the embodiment of the common sense and feelings reflective of society as a
whole. 21 Thus, the defendant's constitutional right to mercy cannot
be impaired by legislative action. Accordingly, the provision which
prevents the court from imposing a life sentence when mitigation is
not found to outweigh aggravating circumstances must be eliminated.
A specific statutory provision must be drafted to provide that the jury
always has the power to recommend a life sentence.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Capital Punishment Act as currently drafted, is unconstitutional. The statute does not represent an intent to assess the types of
murderers who will be deterred. Without an ability to deter, the
statute lacks one of its constitutional underpinnings. The decision to
make a previous conviction for murder an aggravating factor was
error. This evidence is so prejudicial that no matter what mitigating
circumstances are present, it is unlikely that a jury will recommend a
sentence other than death. Furthermore, it is unclear whether a bifurcated trial, which expedites introduction of this evidence, actually
protects a capital defendant. The statute, by not providing an evidentiary requirement for mitigation, effectively denies due process rights
to a capital defendant. Without instructions on how to weigh the
mitigating evidence, juries will act inconsistently with respect to similar mitigating evidence. This will result in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty-condemned in both Furman
and Gregg.
Creation of the presumption that a capital defendant does not
deserve a death sentence when he presents mitigating evidence eliminates some of the arbitrariness in the imposition of the death sentence.
The creation of a presumption also reduces the likelihood that the jury
will summarily reject the defendant's mitigating evidence. Finally,
the statutory provision denying a jury discretion to grant mercy to an
accused facing the death penalty must be held to be unconstitutional
consistent with decisions of the United States and New Jersey Supreme
Courts.
Mary Lou Delahanty
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